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THE RULE OF LAW IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD⎯AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE  
HISASHI OWADA∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is fashionable to speak about the importance in today’s world of the 
“rule of law at the national and international levels.” On the occasion of 
the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations, the 2005 World Summit 
declared in its 2005 World Summit Outcome that “[w]e [Heads of State 
and Government] acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law 
at the national and international levels are essential for sustained economic 
growth, sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and 
hunger.”1 Based on this recognition, the more than 170 heads of state and 
government assembled at the United Nations headquarters identified 
 
 
 ∗ President, International Court of Justice. This presentation was given as the keynote address 
at a conference entitled Law in Japan: A Celebration of the Works of John Owen Haley, an event 
sponsored by the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute and held on May 9, 2008, at Washington 
University in St. Louis. It is partly based on a speech this author gave at the Rule of Law Symposium, 
International Bar Association Annual Conference, Singapore, October 19, 2007. The author wishes to 
express his gratitude to the International Bar Association for allowing the material to be used for the 
present purpose. 
 1. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
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“human rights and the rule of law” as one of the four key areas in which to 
undertake concrete measures so as to provide multilateral solutions.2 
What does the “rule of law at the national and international level” 
signify? Despite the fact that the phrase “the rule of law” is today very 
much in vogue, the concept itself has been the subject of lively debate in 
academic circles, as well as among practitioners who are expected to 
implement the concept in practice. Some even claim that if one were to 
read “any set of articles discussing the rule of law . . . the concept emerges 
looking like the proverbial blind man’s elephant⎯a trunk to one person, a 
tail to another.”3 
The concept of the “rule of law,” and indeed the term itself, has its 
origin in the constitutional doctrine of the common law. But even in this 
rather clearly defined area, the concept has become so overburdened in 
recent years that one eminent authority, Lord Bingham, has suggested that 
the phrase “the rule of law” has become meaningless thanks to ideological 
abuse and general over-use.”4 According to him the concept is described 
by some as “‘an exceedingly elusive notion’ giving rise to a ‘rampant 
divergence of understandings’ and analogous to the notion of the Good in 
the sense that ‘everyone is for it, but have contrasting convictions about 
what it is.’”5 To give an extreme example of this phenomenon, it is well 
known that in the hotly contested battle before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Bush v. Gore,6 each side tried to argue its own case in the name of “the 
rule of law.”7 
This state of confusion, already present in the domestic legal sphere, is 
further exacerbated when one tries to transpose the concept and apply it to 
the international system of governance. The transposition of this concept, 
whose origins lay essentially in Anglo-American constitutional doctrine, 
to the present-day international system raises a number of new issues. For 
example, can a principle that was originally conceived to control the 
exercise of power within the domestic constitutional framework, be 
 
 
 2. The four key areas are: (1) development, (2) peace and collective security, (3) human rights 
and the rule of law, and (4) the strengthening of the United Nations. Id. ¶ 16. 
 3. Rachel Kleinfeld, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF 
LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 31, 32 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006). 
 4. Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 68 (2007) (quoting Judith Shklar, 
Political Theory and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1 (Allan C. 
Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987)). 
 5. Id. (quoting BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 3 (2004)). 
 6. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 7. Bingham, supra note 4, at 68 (citing Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept?, in THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 117, 117–18 (Richard 
Bellamy ed., 2005)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] THE RULE OF LAW IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 189 
 
 
 
 
successfully duplicated in the international legal system where no central 
power exercises control over the community? If it can, does such a 
duplication require a reconceptualization of the principle itself in order to 
adapt it to the different legal conditions of international society? 
Answering these questions first requires an examination of the proper 
nature and scope of the rule of law as the concept has been accepted in the 
traditional context. 
Reconceptualization of the rule of law at the international level in turn 
requires addressing the following two separate but interrelated questions 
that are especially pertinent in the context of the present-day international 
system. First, should the rule of law, when applied at the international 
level, be defined from a formalistic or substantive point of view? In other 
words, should the concept of the rule of law, when transposed to the 
international realm, be read narrowly as referring to its formal aspect of 
“the rule by the laws,” or broadly as referring to the substantive content of 
the law as well? This question has already been hotly debated in the 
domestic context, but it takes on a new significance in light of the unique 
role that the rule of law is expected to play at the international level in the 
present-day world. Second, what entities should be subject to the rule of 
law in this international context? Is the international rule of law limited in 
its application to the interrelationship among sovereign states that 
constitute the international community, or does its application extend to 
the rights and duties on an international level of individuals, who, after all, 
are the ultimate addressees of the legal norms in the global community? 
II. THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW 
In answering these questions, the natural starting point is to examine 
the traditional conception of the rule of law in the domestic sphere. While 
the concept may be elusive from a theoretical point of view, everyone 
would agree that the rule of law must contain certain essential elements. 
For this purpose, it would be useful to start with the famous definition of 
the rule of law by A.V. Dicey, the nineteenth-century constitutional 
authority of England. He explained the salient elements of the rule of law 
as follows: 
 When we say that the supremacy or the rule of law is a 
characteristic of the English constitution, we generally include 
under one expression at least three distinct though kindred 
conceptions. 
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 We mean, in the first place, that no man is punishable or can be 
lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct 
breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the 
ordinary Courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is 
contrasted with every system of government based on the exercise 
by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary power of 
constraint. . . . 
 We mean in the second place . . . , not only that with us no man 
is above the law, but (what is a different thing) that here every man, 
whatever be his rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of 
the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals. 
. . . 
 In the third place, [w]e may say that the constitution is pervaded 
by the rule of law on the ground that the general principles of the 
constitution (as for example the right to personal liberty, or the right 
of public meeting) are with us the result of judicial decisions 
determining the rights of private persons in particular cases brought 
before the Courts; whereas under many foreign constitutions the 
security (such as it is) given to the rights of individuals results, or 
appears to result, from the general principles of the constitution.8 
What this boils down to in terms of a core definition of the rule of law can 
be summarized into the following three elements: 
(1) “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as 
opposed to the influence of arbitrary power”;  
(2) “equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes of 
people to the ordinary law of the land, administered by the ordinary 
Law Courts”; and  
(3) the independence of the courts that secure to individuals their 
rights, which the law of the constitution represents as the result, not 
as the source, of such rights.9 
By identifying these components, Dicey presented the rule of law 
primarily as a constraint on the arbitrary or disparate exercise of sovereign 
power over the individual. In this situation, his conception of the rule of 
 
 
 8. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183–84, 189, 
191 (6th ed. 1902) (footnotes omitted). 
 9. Id. at 198–99. 
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law could be described as tending to be formalistic or process-focused. His 
definition, however, has to be read in the political context of 
nineteenth-century England. Dicey was discussing the issue of the rule of 
law in the England of his day, a “country governed . . . under the rule of 
law,” where “security [was] given under the English constitution to the 
rights of individuals.”10 His main concern, therefore, was the way in which 
the law was made, applied, and enforced in relation to individuals, rather 
than the actual content of the law. The actual substance of the law, 
presumably, was outside the main focus of Dicey’s thesis. Rather, of 
paramount importance to him in this process-focused approach was the 
question of “fundamental principles which are characteristic of a legally 
ordered community and which provided a . . . framework within which 
particular rules of law operate.”11 It is natural that with such a formalistic 
approach to the rule of law, no attempt was made to pass a judgment upon 
the content of the law itself. There is no need for inquiry as to whether the 
laws themselves are “just” or “unjust,”12 so long as the environment for the 
rule of law is secured, and the arbitrary exercise of power by the sovereign 
restrained. 
This naturally raises the question as to whether such a formalistic 
conception of the rule of law is appropriate or adequate in the 
contemporary setting. If it were, then by implication the actual substance 
of the law would not factor into any determination of how the rule of law 
in fact is practiced, so long as the procedural guarantee for the rule of law 
is met. Yet such an approach would lead to the conclusion that Nazi 
Germany or the Union of South Africa, under apartheid⎯to take two 
extreme examples⎯were societies governed by the rule of law.13 
As is clear from the passage quoted above, basic in Dicey’s conception 
of the rule of law is the premise that law is an embodiment of justice in 
 
 
 10. Id. at 180. 
 11. Sir Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT’L L. 15, 22 (1993). 
 12. See Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 467. 
 13. To this dilemma, Joseph Raz responds as follows: 
[T]he rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess and by which it 
is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or 
otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man. A 
non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on 
racial segregation, sexual inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle conform to 
the requirements of the rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the more 
enlightened Western democracies. 
Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY 210, 211 (1979). 
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society, as reflected in the general law of the constitution as the guarantor 
of individual freedom in nineteenth-century England. Thus he declares that 
“some polities, and among them the English constitution, have not been 
created at one stroke [but] are the fruit of contests carried on in the Courts 
on behalf of the rights of individuals.”14 Among those rights that form the 
premise of the rule of law, Dicey refers to the following: 
General propositions . . . as to the nature of the rule of law carry us 
but a very little way. If we want to understand what that principle in 
all its different aspects and developments really means, we must try 
to trace its influence throughout some of the main provisions of the 
constitution [such as] the right to personal freedom; the right to 
freedom of discussion; the right of public meeting; the use of 
martial law; the rights and duties of the army; the collection and 
expenditure of the public revenue; and the responsibility of 
Ministers.15 
When one attempts to transpose this Diceyan model for the rule of law 
onto the international system, one has to keep in mind a number of key 
considerations that distinguish the international legal community from the 
domestic legal community that Dicey envisaged.  
The first such consideration is the absence, in a decentralized system of 
international society consisting of equal sovereign nations, of a single 
sovereign authority analogous to the government in domestic society. In a 
society “where the primary challenge is not the vertical relationship of 
subjects to a sovereign, but the horizontal relationship of subjects to other 
subjects,”16 one cannot compare the legal relations between the state and 
its citizens in domestic law to the legal relations between the nation-states 
in international law. The traditional legal framework of the international 
system, often described as the “Westphalian legal order,” leaves these 
nation-states, in principle, free to act within their own domestic 
jurisdiction. In this situation with no “common sovereign power” to which 
all nation-states are subject, the rule of law framework as proffered by 
Dicey cannot ensure the guarantee of justice that Dicey’s model assumed 
as its end result. Since the natural corollary of the internal sovereignty of 
nation-states is that no single state may exercise power or authority over 
 
 
 14. DICEY, supra note 8, at 192 (emphasis added). 
 15. Id. at 199–200. 
 16. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 333 (2008). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol8/iss2/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] THE RULE OF LAW IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 193 
 
 
 
 
another, some have argued that “the rule of law cannot meaningfully exist 
in the international arena, where there is no ‘common sovereign power.’”17 
The second, and more important, consideration is that such a 
process-focused approach to the rule of law cannot perform the legitimate 
role in the international legal system that it was expected to play in the 
original, Diceyan conception. A narrow, process-focused approach to the 
rule of law framework will not secure the end objectives to which the rule 
of law aspires in the context of the international community as a 
community of human individuals. Given this situation, it becomes 
imperative to insist on an ends-focused approach to the rule of law. In 
other words, the rule of law, when translated to the international context, 
should be reconceptualized in such a way that it would serve to constrain 
states from acting in gross violation of the fundamental principles of 
justice and human rights that should underpin the contemporary 
international legal order. 
For this reason, the conception of the rule of law, when transposed to 
the international level, should include not only the process of how law is 
made, applied, and enforced, but also the substantive aspect of what law 
represents. This is particularly true in the context of norms that cast the 
fundamental value of human dignity as the basic norm of today’s 
international community. It is thus my submission that the concept of the 
rule of law, when applied at the international level, requires a holistic 
reconceptualization of the principle that incorporates both its process and 
its substance, taking account of the systemic differences between the 
domestic and international legal order. 
III. RESTRAINTS ON STATE AUTONOMY IN INTER-STATE RELATIONS 
Let me begin by briefly reviewing the first aspect of the rule of law in 
the contemporary international system, namely the constraints upon the 
exercise of power by sovereigns in inter-state relations. What essentially 
characterizes this system of governance is the absence of a global 
sovereign authority and the consequent autonomy of states vis-à-vis one 
another. This defines the traditional manner in which states interact in the 
international arena. Nonetheless, an extensive and well-developed corpus 
of law has arisen through agreement among states, especially since the 
second half of the twentieth century, to regulate a wide array of state 
activities in the international arena. The areas covered include 
 
 
 17. Charles Sampford, Reconceiving the Rule of Law for a Globalizing World, in 
GLOBALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 9, 10 (Spencer Zifcak ed., 2005). 
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international regulatory regimes on the use of force and disarmament, 
environment and trade, transport and communications, oceans, and even 
outer space. What international regime specialists describe as “the process 
of legalization” is in full swing.18 
Moreover, the effects of globalization have contributed to the birth of 
an impressive number of legal frameworks, either global or regional, for 
economic and social activities among states that transgress national 
borders.19 This makes it “impossible for States to be wholly unaffected by 
the consequences, either political or economic, of actions by or 
confrontations between other States.”20 
The result has been a dramatic expansion of the scope and reach of 
international law through the legalization of these activities among states 
by numerous treaties and agreements, as well as a remarkable growth of 
international institutions charged with the task of implementing 
substantive rules of international law in the name of the public interest of 
the international community.21 Through the legalization of the conduct of 
states in their international relations, these substantive rules of law 
contribute to the consolidation of the international public order by 
balancing the national interests of individual states against the public 
interests of the international community. This legalization thus restricts the 
freedom of sovereign states to act arbitrarily on the basis of “asymmetries 
in [state] power and the potential for political abuse that such asymmetries 
entail.”22 Building and strengthening the rule-based framework for the 
conduct of states makes their interactions more predictable and deters 
unilateral or arbitrary conduct by states.23 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN RELATION TO INDIVIDUALS 
In today’s world, however, the significance of the rule of law stretches 
far beyond its application to traditional inter-state relations. I submit that 
this is the second aspect of the rule of law at the international level. 
 
 
 18. See, e.g., Special Issue, Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 (2000) (special 
issue devoted to the treatment of the issue of legalization of the international regime in international 
relations). 
 19. Spencer Zifcak, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Rethinking Values and Reforming Institutions, 
in GLOBALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 32, 33. 
 20. Watts, supra note 11, at 24. 
 21. Zifcak, supra note 19, at 33.  
 22. Mattias Kumm, International Law in National Courts: The International Rule of Law and the 
Limits of the Internationalist Model, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 19, 24 (2003). 
 23. Watts, supra note 11, at 33. 
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In the current globalizing world, the attention of the international 
community has been increasingly focused on the impact of the 
international rule of law on individuals. At the present stage of 
development of the international system, the rule of law in relation to 
inter-state relations alone is no longer adequate to characterize the 
international rule of law. The crucial importance of the rule of law as 
applied to individuals has to be appreciated in the new context of the 
international community—where the need to uphold certain inviolable 
principles of justice and human dignity while protecting the rights of 
individuals at the international level has come to be recognized. Indeed, 
international law has developed to such an extent that it has brought about 
a shift in the international legal order away from the purely state-centric 
system that once defined it. Nowhere is this more evident than in the rapid 
expansion and increasing prominence of humanitarian and human rights 
law. 
The dramatic rise in the importance of these fields as pillars of the 
international legal system has altered the system in two crucial and 
interrelated respects. First, it has injected into the international legal order 
substantive rules relating to human rights based on the principles of justice 
and fundamental human values that transcend the national boundaries of 
states. Second, it in turn has brought the individual to the center of the 
international legal system as a subject of international law with 
internationally cognizable rights. These developments place further legal 
constraints on the conduct of sovereign states in the international 
community; they also prescribe international norms to guarantee an 
international standard of justice that is substantive in character, stretching 
the rule of law beyond its narrower, more formalistic aspects. 
This new development in the international legal landscape has so far 
been taking place largely within the area of substantive rules relating to 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. By contrast, the 
procedural framework for guaranteeing these substantive rules on the 
international plane has been somewhat slower to develop. It is true that the 
world has seen some remarkable institutional developments in this respect 
as well, as demonstrated at the global level by the creation of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee, the International Criminal Tribunals 
(ICTY, ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and at the 
regional level by the birth of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICHR), and the 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Nevertheless, the overall 
picture of the international legal landscape in this respect is that the 
procedural mechanisms for guaranteeing the substantive rights of 
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individuals recognized at the international level remain to be implemented 
primarily through the national legal system of each state. Against this 
backdrop, an approach to the rule of law at the international level that 
would leave the entire issue of substantive rules to the discretion of the 
domestic legal system of each state would not fully achieve the purpose 
that the rule of law has historically been meant to serve. An approach to 
the rule of law at the international level that incorporates certain basic 
universal values underlying substantive international law thus becomes 
crucial in order for the rule of law to achieve its main objectives at the 
international level. 
Unlike a more formalistic conception of the rule of law based on the 
process-focused approach that focuses on the manner in which the law is 
formed, applied, and enforced, the reconceptualized rule of law at the 
international level, based on this ends-focused approach, has to look 
beyond the formal side of the picture to see if the laws themselves are 
fundamentally just. Needless to say, in doing so the rule of law has to 
continue to insist on its traditional formal aspects,24 such as the supremacy 
of the law, equality before the law, and the existence of independent 
monitoring systems, in its application to the international system. 
However, these formal elements of the rule of law alone are not sufficient 
in this new situation to achieve the end objectives that the rule of law is 
meant to serve in the international community. In the ends-focused 
approach to the international rule of law as it applies to individuals, the 
rule of law cannot be said to prevail if the laws themselves are unjust or 
oppressive.25 Rather, the substantive content of justice in its essential 
elements has to be incorporated into the rule of law itself; it prescribes that 
“[individuals] have moral rights and duties with respect to one another, 
and political rights against the state as a whole.”26  
The contemporary international legal system has increasingly done just 
this. Fundamental justice and human rights, regarded as universal values 
by the international community as a whole, have thus become entrenched 
in the international rule of law. Through the process of globalization, 
“[p]olitical, economic, and technological changes have had globalizing 
ramifications that penetrate state borders in ways that transformed the core 
 
 
 24. Craig, supra note 12, at 478. 
 25. Watts, supra note 11, at 23. 
 26. Craig, supra note 12, at 477 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11–12 
(1985)). 
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rule of law values in the international legal order and [have] created a shift 
away from the previously prevailing state-centric system.”27 
The expansion of international humanitarian law and the increasing 
prominence of human rights law have precipitated a paradigm shift in the 
international legal system by injecting the essential components of justice 
into the rule of law at the international level. This is demonstrated by the 
incorporation of these universal values into new treaties and international 
conventions as well as through the work of numerous regional and 
international institutions and tribunals charged with the task of enforcing 
and monitoring breaches of the law. Among the manifestations of these 
changes is the dramatic expansion of international criminal law and the 
international judicial mechanisms associated with its enforcement. The 
work of ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, coupled with the advent of the 
International Criminal Court, have greatly raised the profile of individuals 
within international law by extending to individuals judicial accountability 
at the international level for criminal breaches of humanitarian law and 
human rights law. Thus, “[c]ontemporary humanitarian law reaches well 
beyond the parameters of international armed conflict to regulate 
persecution internal to states.”28 For example, the International Court of 
Justice, in its recent judgment in the Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo case,29 embraced this approach by holding that the internal 
situation in the Congo is subject to a conception of the rule of law based 
on the substantive norms of humanitarian law and human rights law, such 
as the Hague and Geneva Conventions relating to the laws of war, the 
International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights, and the Convention 
on Torture.  
V. THE PROCESS OF LEGALIZATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 
These developments in the rule of law at the international level are 
gaining much more significance as globalization of the international 
community continues. Thus, as a result of the process of globalization 
“[i]n many issue-areas, the world is witnessing a move to law.”30 It is 
 
 
 27. Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 355, 357 (2002). 
 28. Id. at 360–61. 
 29. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 
116 (Dec. 19). 
 30. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385, 
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claimed that “[t]his move to law is not limited to the actions of 
international tribunals,”31 though in recent years there has been a 
mushrooming of cases before various international tribunals involving 
state activities in wide-ranging fields, as evidenced by the proceedings of 
the WTO Appellate Body, the European Court of Justice, NAFTA, and the 
ITLOS, not to mention the International Court of Justice. 
However, this move to law in the international system goes much 
deeper than the area of those state activities. As human activities expand 
across national borders and the concern for the public interest of the 
international community as a whole permeates these human activities at 
the international level, the process of legalization for such activities 
through the creation of rule-based regimes has come to play an important 
role in the international system. 
Legalization is a term coined by international regime specialists to 
describe this move towards rule-based regimes in international relations. 
Legalization can be said to be “a particular form of institutionalization”32 
of international relations. In this sense one can observe a close relationship 
between this process of legalization and the development of the rule of law 
in the international community. According to those specialists, the 
definition of legalization contains three criteria: the degree to which rules 
are obligatory upon the players of the system; the legal precision of those 
rules; and the delegation of the power of interpretation, monitoring, and 
implementation of the rules to a third party.33 These criteria closely 
correspond to the three essential elements of the rule of law described in a 
previous section, i.e., the supremacy of the law, equality before the law, 
and the existence of an independent judiciary to apply the law. Seen in this 
way, there is a clear parallelism between the development of the rule of 
law and the process of legalization in the present-day world, although each 
tends to approach the same phenomenon from a somewhat different angle. 
A significant overlap can therefore be observed between the process of 
legalization and the development of the rule of law in the international 
context. What I have discussed at some length earlier as new 
developments in the international rule of law are matched by the growth in 
the process of legalizing activities within the international system. We can 
see that, in turn, the legalization of institutional regimes in many areas of 
 
 
385 (2000). 
 31. Id. at 386. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 387. 
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human activity in the globalizing world is contributing to the 
strengthening of the rule of law. 
In this globalizing world, international institutions are growing in all 
shapes and sizes, while varying significantly in the contents constituting 
the sets of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures that characterize 
them. Legalization tries to describe this move towards the creation of a 
rule-based international community. 
Admittedly, legalization as such, representing a process towards a 
rule-based society, does not include a consideration of the substantive 
content of the rules in question. It is also true that legalization as a process 
in the international system can expand its scope to embrace rules which 
are commonly referred to as “soft law,” as distinct from “hard law,” on 
which the rule of law has traditionally tended to focus. As such, progress 
in legalization may serve more as a measure for analyzing the extent to 
which the members of the community embrace the rule-based framework 
to regulate their activities, rather than the intensity in which the 
obligations involved are to be observed. 
Be that as it may, there can be no question that legalization can be said 
to form an essential part of the process for the creation of the rule-based 
international community. It helps to regulate relations between actors at 
the international level and to shape the legal framework for the relations 
among various players in the system, including individuals, at all levels in 
this world arena. 
Seen in this way, the process of legalization has significant 
implications for the international rule of law. At the present stage of 
development of the international system, as I stated earlier, the rule of law 
in relation to inter-state relations alone is no longer adequate to 
characterize the phenomenon of the international rule of law. In this 
situation, the crucial importance that the rule of law plays when applied to 
individuals has to be recognized in the context of the growing recognition 
in the international community of the need to uphold certain inviolable 
principles of justice and human dignity and to protect the rights of 
individuals at the international level. These developments place further 
legal constraints on the conduct of sovereign states in the international 
community; they prescribe international norms to guarantee an 
international standard of justice that is substantive in character, stretching 
beyond its narrower, more formalistic aspects. In this sense the process of 
legalization helps to gauge exactly how much the international rule of law 
is being implemented in various areas and regions. 
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VI. THE PROGRESS IN THE PROCESS OF LEGALIZATION IN EAST ASIA34 
It is in this context that the issue of legalization in East Asia becomes 
highly relevant to examining the overall state of the rule of law in that 
region. Since some have suggested that the pattern of legalization among 
international institutions is “spatially circumscribed,”35 the Asia-Pacific 
region presents a particularly interesting case in this picture. 
One sometimes hears the assertion that the Asia-Pacific region—to the 
extent such a “region” can clearly be demarcated—lags behind others in 
terms of the degree to which the relations among its members are 
“legalized.” However, I submit that such a simplistic region-by-region 
approach to the issue of legalization does not provide a fully accurate 
picture of how the Asia-Pacific region approaches the issue of legalized 
institutions. A prevailing view tends to argue that, considering the rapidly 
increasing economic and security interdependence that has characterized 
the region in recent decades, the Asia-Pacific region still lacks robustly 
legalized regional institutions as compared to regions such as Europe and 
North America.36 Yet this perspective seems to ignore the degree to which 
states in the Asia-Pacific region have embraced legalized institutions on a 
global basis beyond the confines of the region itself. When considered 
from a global standpoint, states in the region have demonstrated a high 
degree of cooperation in global organizations and in institutions that are 
highly legalized in their essential characteristics. This fact contradicts the 
assertion that the region is averse to the concept of legalization in its 
international relations. 
Some also advance an argument suggesting that despite increased 
institution-building in the 1990s in the Asia-Pacific region, “those regional 
institutions constructed with significant Asian participation [have] 
remained highly informal and explicitly rejected legalization in their 
design”37 and that this is also a reflection of the uniquely Asian legal 
culture. In this Asian legal culture, it is contended that “[f]ormal rules and 
obligations [are] limited in number; codes of conduct or principles have 
been favored over precisely defined agreements; and disputes have been 
managed, if not resolved, without delegation to third-party adjudication.”38 
 
 
 34. My view expressed here is close to that of Professor Alvarez (see infra note 42), to whom I 
wish to express indebtedness. 
 35. Miles Kahler, Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case, 54 INT’L ORG. 549, 549 
(2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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Thus, it has been suggested that this low level of regional legalization is a 
manifestation of an innate aversion to the rule of law throughout the 
region. 
One common explanation of this phenomenon⎯and one that is 
sometimes offered in the region itself⎯is that this state of affairs 
originates from the traditional mind-set and legal culture of the region. In 
other words, the theory of a uniquely distinct Asian legal culture, as 
reflected in the famous assertion of “Asian values,” is offered to explain 
this asserted aversion to “Western-style” legalized institutions. Asian legal 
culture is described in its very nature as “less adversarial and [less] 
litigious, less intent on demonstrating right and wrong, [and] more 
concerned with avoiding conflict.”39 Deeply held traditional values, it is 
claimed, are not easily washed away, and associated preferences for 
“harmony, consensus, informality, and avoidance of legalism,” do not 
mesh with Western ways.40 In this cultural environment, settlement of 
disputes through legal means is not seen as productive or beneficial, and 
despite the advent of Western-style legal systems in the region, avoidance 
of litigation continues to be the dominant social norm.41 Asian 
governments and peoples—so the argument goes—prefer talking through 
disputes among themselves rather than yielding their disputes to a decision 
on the basis of objective criteria for settlement; as a result, Asians prefer to 
opt for non-adversarial modes of discourse to resolve their difficulties.42 
The perceived benefit of avoiding the rule-based settlement of disputes is 
the reduction of disputes generally and the strengthening of group 
cohesion;43 disputes are “managed,” not “litigated.”44 
What is more, there are even those who argue more cynically that the 
so-called “ASEAN way” of managing disputes by favoring informal 
institutions “may result from not only the construction of social myths 
about harmony and a national past untouched by Western influence but 
also [from] conscious political programs to dampen adversarial conflict 
internally and internationally.”45 
 
 
 39. Id. at 560. 
 40. Id. (citing Carl J. Green, APEC and Trans-pacific Dispute Management, 26 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 719, 730–31 (1995)). 
 41. Carl J. Green, APEC and Trans-pacific Dispute Management, 26 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 
719, 730–31 (1995). 
 42. José E. Alvarez, Institutionalised Legalisation and the Asia-Pacific “Region,” 5 N.Z. J. PUB. 
& INT’L L. 9, 16 (2007). 
 43. Green, supra note 41, at 731. 
 44. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 16 (citing Kahler, supra note 35, at 549). 
 45. Kahler, supra note 35, at 561. 
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I submit that using such a monochrome picture to define the social 
behavior of people in the region vis-à-vis legalization is clearly a gross 
oversimplification of reality. The Asia-Pacific region is highly diverse in 
its ethnic, historical, cultural, and social background, to say nothing of 
differences in political and economic development. An expert claims that 
“[m]ost Asian societies, particularly in Southeast Asia, display legal 
pluralism rather than monolithic legal cultures and homogenous legal 
institutions.”46 The numerous and highly varied religious and colonial 
histories that characterize this region also tend to contradict such a 
caricaturized generalization. The idea that there exists a single, 
mainstream cultural aversion to legalized institutions is not endorsed by 
facts. Categorizing such a diverse group of states and cultures into a 
single, coherent “region” risks oversimplification and thus blurs the 
distinct diversity that exists among them.47 
It may be readily admitted that in general Asian societies are less 
litigious than some over-litigious societies in the West. Nevertheless, 
experience shows that Asian states are not shying away from rule-based 
systems in which the impact of globalization affects the socio-economic 
framework of the community in question. By way of an illustration, it can 
be shown that there exists a marked contrast between the level of 
legalization in regional institutions of East Asia and the level of 
participation of Asian nations in global institutions with highly legalized 
regimes. Some further explanations are required for this state of affairs.  
It is intriguing to observe that in the case of the European Union, by 
contrast, highly-developed dispute settlement mechanisms within the 
Union have not necessarily been matched by the same level of legalization 
in its relationship with regions outside of Europe. In comparison, countries 
in the Asian-Pacific region do not appear any less likely to adhere to their 
WTO commitments, for example, than countries in the EU.48 This is 
demonstrated by the fact that since 1995, East Asian countries have 
participated in as many as ninety-one dispute settlement procedures before 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. One expert has even noted that 
Asian-Pacific governments have “embraced legalization in particular 
issue-areas when it serves [their] national purposes.”49 In this picture, the 
impact of globalization seems to be a major, if not decisive, factor. 
 
 
 46. Id. at 560 (citing M.B. HOOKER, A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA (1978)). 
 47. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 20. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Kahler, supra note 35, at 562. 
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It is true that some countries in the region have a stronger aversion to 
legalization in areas such as human rights than to legalization in economic 
areas. This, however, may just as easily be explained by indigenous 
political factors peculiar to the countries in question. The United States, 
for that matter, behaves in very much the same way as any Asian-Pacific 
country, which can be explained by topic-specific political factors 
involved. The establishment of regional institutions in Asia, moreover, has 
coincided with the region’s participation in the world-wide institutions of 
the post-World War II legal order.50 Taken together, I submit that these 
contrasting pictures support the conclusion that this situation, rather than 
exhibiting some wholesale regional aversion to legalization, may be 
nothing more than the result of strategic calculations guiding the policy 
decisions of governments in the region not to engage in legalized 
institutions in certain issue-specific areas. Such a phenomenon is not 
unique to the Asia-Pacific region but can be observed all over the world. 
There may well be greater political considerations guiding the decisions of 
individual governments in the region as to whether, in particular instances 
or issue-areas, to shy away from legalized frameworks. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case51 
demonstrates, the rule of law at the international level increasingly 
permeates the rule of law at the national level which by virtue of national 
sovereignty has traditionally fallen within the exclusive domain of the 
state. In many of the areas where international law regulates the activities 
of states within their own national borders, the international rule of law 
prescribes the contents of the internal rule of law.52 As the result of this 
development in international conventional and customary law, the 
fundamental human rights of individuals are now beyond the power of any 
single state to determine and confer. In this situation “[t]he position of 
individuals within the state is increasingly the subject of external scrutiny 
and, in extreme cases, may be the cause of external intervention.”53  
These changes in international legal order acquire particular 
significance in the context of fostering the rule of law at an international 
 
 
 50. Alvarez, supra note 42, at 24. 
 51. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 
116 (Dec. 19). 
 52. James Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law, ADEL. L. REV. 3, 7–8 (2008). 
 53. Zifcak, supra note 19, at 34. 
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level. Especially where national institutions are weak, non-existent, or 
oppressive, as is the case in some developing parts of Asia, the promotion 
of the international rule of law takes on an enhanced importance. 
The former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, recognized 
this link between the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict societies and 
the requirements of the international rule of law when he made the 
following statement: 
The “rule of law” is a concept at the very heart of the 
Organization’s mission. It refers to a principle of governance at 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and 
which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency.54 
This obviously could apply to some individual situations in East Asia, as 
well as to situations in other regions of the world. 
The United Nations sees its role in this field as assisting in the 
development of the rule of law, especially in transitional and post-conflict 
societies. According to the former Secretary-General, the United Nations’ 
efforts to advance the rule of law are normatively based, alongside the 
Charter of the United Nations, in what he labels the four pillars of the 
modern international legal system. They are: international human rights 
law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and 
international refugee law.55 
It is becoming increasingly clear that states can no longer legitimately 
be allowed to hide behind the cloak of sovereignty to escape 
accountability for failing to protect the fundamental human rights of their 
own nationals. Under international law, states have the “responsibility to 
protect” their own nationals from oppression and the denial of justice. And 
this is part and parcel of the rule of law at the international level. When 
 
 
 54. The Secretary-General, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies, ¶ 6, delivered to the Security Council 
and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. ¶ 9. 
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national institutions are unable or unwilling to uphold such principles of 
justice in these areas, the claim that they are ruling by a system of laws is 
not sufficient. In this sense, “the rule of law” is not synonymous with “the 
rule by the laws.” In such cases, the international rule of law—supported 
by the moral authority of the international community as a whole—fills 
the vacuum in the domestic legal system and intervenes to require their 
observance in accordance with the norms of international law.  
This takes on a special significance in the context of post-conflict 
societies, where domestic state institutions are often unable or unwilling to 
defend the substantive rights of individuals. In such situations, simply to 
work towards building an institutional framework for the rule of law 
through creating codes of laws, establishing the judiciary, and training 
judges and other legal professionals, while important and necessary in 
themselves, will not be sufficient for the establishment of the rule of law 
in society. More importantly, the state must foster a socio-political culture 
that enables the practice of the rule of law as part of social life. This is the 
essential premise Dicey used to advocate for his construction of the rule of 
law. 
I submit that this is a task many nations in East Asia, and especially 
those in transitional or post-conflict stages of nation-building, must tackle. 
Recognition of basic principles of justice and fundamental human rights as 
part of the public order of society at the international level means that this 
international rule of law has to be integrated into the polity of these 
transitional or post-conflict societies, including those in East Asia. 
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